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Mortgage debt dwarfed consumer debt by fourfold in the first 
quarter of 2005 according to the American Bankers Association (ABA).  
Part of this growth could be attributed to the proliferation of 
nontraditional mortgage products such as interest-only loans and loans 
with little or no documentation of down payment sources or income.  
The rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market in the early and 
mid-2000s helped introduce credit constrained households to the 
mortgage debt market.  Unfortunately, by 2008 it became clear that 
the expansion of credit was a failed experiment.  Borrowers, investors, 
originators, banks, and rating agencies did not understand the risks 
imbedded in nontraditional mortgage products.  This paper attempts to 
provide information on the performance and competing risks of default 
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and prepayment of one non-traditional mortgage product – the 2/28 
hybrid, a type of adjustable rate loan.  
Since the introduction of Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM) in 
the early 1980s, recent ARM market shares in the conventional 
conforming prime market have been fairly modest (10 to 30  percent 
from 2003 through 2005) (Fannie Mae (2006)).  In contrast, the ARM 
market share for securitized subprime loans has been increasing from 
approximately 30% in 1999 to 48% on 2003 and 52% in 2006.  In 
addition, ARMs are also equally popular products in the jumboi market 
(Nothaft (2003)). 
The typical ARM product in subprime is not the traditional one-
year ARM indexed to Treasury bill yields.  Instead, a hybrid product 
that mixes fixed and adjustable attributes dominates the market place.  
For example, the ABA reports that two thirds of adjustable rate 
purchase loans were 2/28 hybrids.  The 2 indicates that the first 2 
years of the loan have a fixed interest rate, while the 28 indicates that 
the remaining 28 years of the loan have an adjustable interest rate.  
Loan Performance data indicate that almost all 2/28 hybrids adjust 
every six months and are indexed to the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR).ii     
To the authors’ knowledge, this paper provides the first 
empirical examination of the performance of 2/28 hybrid mortgages in 
the subprime market.  A competing risk framework is employed that 
allows for the dependence of the two types of termination (default and 
prepayment) and controls for unobserved heterogeneity without 
assuming a shape to the unobserved distribution.  When the 
probabilities of default or prepayment are discussed we are referring 
the conditional probability or hazard rate not the cumulative rate most 
media discuss.  In addition, a large national data set of loans 
originated from 1998-2005 is used that includes loans backed by real 
estate and securitized in the asset-backed securities market by private 
firms (private label).  The performance of subprime 30-year hybrid 
loans is compared with concurrently originated subprime 30-year fixed 
rate loans.  
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Literature on Adjustable and Hybrid Rate Loans 
ARMs provide unique benefits and costs from both the borrower 
and the lender’s perspective.iii  Unlike Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRMs), 
ARMs potentially impose payment shocks on the borrower as interest 
rates increase.  On the other hand, if interest rates decrease, at the 
prescribed adjustment date, the borrower will automatically benefit 
from lower payment.iv  In other words, the borrower using an ARM 
takes on interest rate risk that the lender usually faces when 
originating or investing in a fixed rate product.  In terms of pricing, 
lenders provide lower initial interest rates to compensate the borrower 
for bearing more of the interest rate risk (Brueckner (1986), and Sa-
Aadu and Sirmans (1989)).  In practice there is continuum of interest 
rate risk sharing.  For example, caps and floors on how much rates can 
change over the life of the mortgage or in each adjustment period can 
be used to shield the borrower from large or fast adjustments in 
underlying interest rates.  Therefore, while holding lender-expected 
returns constant, the more interest rate risk the borrower takes on, 
the lower the expected cost for the borrowing should be.  This feature 
can make ARMs more affordable and easier to qualify for than FRMs.  
Many ARMs also have initial interest rates that are below the fully 
indexed rate (the teaser rate).  Therefore, even if the index is constant 
through time, the interest rate and monthly payment paid by the ARM 
borrower using a teaser will increase until the rate is fully adjusted 
(index plus the margin or spread). 
There is a growing literature that examines the use of hybrid 
loans and other non-traditional mortgage types that were used in 
subprime lending.  LaCour-Little and Yang (2008), Chambers, Garriga, 
and Schlagenhauf (2007), and Chomsisengphet, Murphy, and 
Pennington-Cross (2009) focus on mechanisms used to offer lower 
initial payments (teaser rates, negative amortization, and balloon 
payments) and find that future house prices, income, demographics, 
interest rates and risk preference play an important role.   In general 
mortgages like the 2/28 make most sense for borrowers who expect to 
hold the loan for a short period of time before the teaser rate expires.  
This short holding period reflects a hope that circumstances will 
improve in the future due to improved credit scores, increased wealth, 
or increased income making it possible to refinance or move. 
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There is evidence that under asymmetric information a 
separating equilibrium exists where high default risk borrowers choose 
to finance using an ARM (Posey and Yavas (2001)).  Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that the subprime market is associated with 
much higher rates of ARM usage than the conventional prime market.  
It is also widely believed that borrowers who expect to move or prepay 
their mortgage in the near future are likely to self-select into ARMs 
(Brueckner (1986), Brueckner and Follain (1988), and Dhillon, Shilling, 
and Sirmans (1987)).   Consistent with these issues, our estimation 
data set (discussed below) indicates that on average hybrid borrowers 
have lower credit scores, provide a smaller down payment, and are 
more likely to have a prepayment penalty on the loan.  In fact, the 
typical prepayment penalty last more than two years.  Therefore, most 
loans that refinance at the rest date also pay penalty.  In addition, on 
average hybrid loans terminate through both default and prepayment 
at elevated rates.  It will be an empirical question as to whether these 
observed differences are explained by borrower and location 
characteristics or reflect a unique hybrid specific termination profile. 
There is a fairly substantial empirical literature on the 
termination of ARMs.  In general, the traditional ARM seems to 
respond in a similar fashion to the economic and financial incentives to 
default or prepay a mortgage.  For example, default is more likely 
when there is negative or low equity in a home and prepayments are 
more likely when prevailing interest on mortgages have declined.  
However, there is mixed evidence on the impact of teaser rates and 
other ARM-specific terms on terminations (Ambrose and LaCour-Little 
(2001), Calhoun and Deng (2002), Green and Shilling (1997), 
Vanderhoff (1996), Brueckner and Follain (1988), and Cunningham 
and Capone (1990)).  In the paper most similar to our own, Amborse, 
LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) examine the performance of 3/27 
hybrid loans from one lender using a sample of 181 observed defaults 
on over 2,000 loans originated in 1995 and 1996.  They find that the 
time period when the loan converts from a fixed to an adjustable rate 
is associated with a substantial and permanent increase in the 
conditional hazard of default and with a substantial but temporary 
increase in the conditional hazard of prepayment.   
Our following empirical investigation contributes to the literature 
by (1) including a much larger sample of hybrids, (2) providing direct 
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comparisons with concurrently originated FRMs, (3) including many 
lenders,  (4) covering the subprime market, and (5) using more recent 
data.  
Competing Risks Estimation with Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
A loan can terminate through either default or prepayment – 
two options that compete with each other to be the first observed 
event.  We jointly model the probability of default and prepayment in a 
competing risks proportional hazard framework that also accounts for 
the unobserved factors that influence the termination of the 
mortgages.  We employ the empirical approach used by Yu (2006), 
who investigates bank bankruptcy and mergers.  This method is based 
on the work by Han and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992), and 
McCall (1996) and follows real estate applications of these models by 
Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996), and Clapp, Deng and An (1996) 
among others.   
Let TD, TP, and TC be the duration to default, prepayment, and 
the end of the sample period (censored), respectively.  For a mortgage 
j with j=1,…,N the first realized termination time is observed, 
Tj=min{TP,TD,TC}.  To explain the termination history of the loans, we 
control for both observed heterogeneity X(t), which can be time-
constant or time-variant, and unobserved heterogeneity (ΘD, ΘP), 
which has the joint density g(θD, θP) and is assumed to be independent 
of X(t).  The dependence between the two risks (default and prepay) 
conditioning on X is related directly to the distribution of the 
unobserved characteristics -- that is, the correlation of the unobserved 
heterogeneity parameters.   
The cause-specific hazard function (the probability of 
termination at time t conditioned on survival to time t) is defined as 
t
XtTtTtP
Xt PDr
t
PD
r



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 (1) 
for r=D, P. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Real Estate Economics, Vol 38, No. 3 (Fall 2010): pg. 399-46. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been granted 
for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
6 
 
 
For our empirical estimation, the hazards are specified in the 
following form 
})()(exp{),,|( 0 rr
r
PD
r tXtXt   ,     
 (2) 
where r=D, P and )(0 t
r denotes the baseline hazard for risk r.  The loan 
subscript j has been dropped for convenience.  We investigate two 
possible forms of the baseline hazard functions.  In the polynomial 
form, the baseline is parameterized as a quadratic function of the loan 
age: 2
2100 )( ttt
rrrr    (for identification purpose r0  is fixed at 0).  
Alternatively, the shape of the baseline might be imposed by 
employing a standard such as the “PSA experience” and shifting the 
PSA up or down to match the observed level of terminations in the 
subprime mortgage market.v   
Since the outcomes are assumed to be independent of each 
other when conditioning on observed and unobserved characteristics, 
the conditional survival function is defined as: 
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If we denote the indicator variables for termination by default ID 
and prepay IP, then a typical loan j has the following likelihood 
function: 
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 (4) 
Since termination and mortgage payments occur at discrete 
intervals of the same length (monthly frequency), we make the 
assumption that the time-varying covariates X(t) are constant within 
each interval.  In other words, if there are T* potential termination 
times, then X(t - ∆) = X(t), 0 < ∆ < 1, t = 1,…,T*.  As noted by 
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Sueyoshi (1992), this is a natural assumption given the inherent 
discreteness of sampling and the lack of a priori knowledge about the 
evolution of the covariates over time.  Under this condition (4) is 
reduced to 
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For estimation purpose we assume that the unobserved 
heterogeneities follow a discrete probability distribution with M points 
of support (or mass points), pm, where


M
m
mp
1
1.  The approach 
estimates the size of M distinct groups of loans with distinct 
probabilities of default and prepay.  Further, following Dong and 
Koppelman (2003) and Yu (2006), to ensure that the probabilities lie 
within [0, 1] and sum up to 1, we use a logistic transformation on the 
mass-point estimates 
),/(  mm qqm eep            
 (6) 
where -∞ < qm < ∞ and q1 is normalized to 0.vi 
Data  
Our empirical analysis investigates the performance of FRM and 
hybrid mortgages to determine whether and how they respond 
differently to mortgage characteristics and time-varying financial and 
economic incentives to terminate the loan.  Data are from the 
LoanPerformance Asset Backed Securities loan-level database and 
represent only the securitized portion of the subprime market.vii  The 
loans included in our data sets are originated between 1998 and 2005, 
and performance is followed monthly for up to eight years until the 
end of 2005.  Besides end-of-sample censoring, the data are also left-
censored in the sense that loans are often allowed to season for 
various amounts of time before becoming part of the securities pool.  
To facilitate the estimation of the hazard functions we limit our 
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samples to the 2-month seasoned loans only.  The FRM sample 
consists of over 72,000 30-year fixed rate single-family owner 
occupied mortgages (purchases and refinances), and the ARM sample 
includes over 101,000 2/28 hybrid loans.viii  The 2/28 hybrid 
instruments make up the majority of the adjustable rate mortgage 
universe, averaging over 68 percent of all ARMs in our data between 
1998 and 2005.  
To help describe the data and differences between hybrids and 
FRMs, we conducted a preliminary analysis of our sample data using 
the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimators.  The Kaplan-Meier 
method has the advantage that it can account for right-censored data.  
Specifically, we estimate the Kaplan-Meier cause-specific hazard 
functions (Figures 1 and 2), the cumulative default and prepay 
functions (Figure 3), and the survival function (Figure 4) for both 
hybrid and fixed rate loans by loan age.ix  A loan is considered to 
default if it becomes “Real Estate Owned (REO)” property or if 
foreclosure proceedings are initiated.  A loan is prepaid when the 
balance becomes zero and in the prior month the loan was either 
current or delinquent.  We focus on the first 60 months because, as 
the loans get older, there are fewer observations and the censorship 
problem also becomes more severe, making the estimates less 
reliable.  The figures show that for our loan samples, the 2/28 hybrids 
tended to default more than the 30-year fixed rate mortgages, with 
the monthly default rate reaching a peak of 1.5 percent at around the 
30th month.  About 10 percent of FRMs (20 percent of hybrids) have 
defaulted five years after origination.  Hybrids prepaid much faster 
than FRMs during the two-year period after the first adjustment date 
(25th month).  In fact, the peak conditional monthly hazard of 
prepayment is above 12 percent in the first month that the loans 
change over to adjustable rates.   Approximately 20 percent of hybrids 
survived after three years while 40 percent of FRMs survived.  In the 
following sections we will incorporate explanatory variables in a 
competing risks analysis to better understand the default and prepay 
patterns of adjustable and fixed rate mortgages.  
To estimate the conditional monthly default and prepay 
probabilities specified in equation (2) for hybrid and fixed rate loans, 
we include various mortgage and market characteristics as our 
covariates.  Table 1 describes the variables and Table 2 provides some 
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summary statistics for our estimation samples.  Due to the different 
nature of the fixed and adjustable rate mortgage contracts we use a 
different set of covariates for each loan product.   
The mortgage variables common to the two models are 
borrower’s credit score at origination, fico, the current loan-to-value 
ratio, cltv, indicators of loan documentation and prepayment penalty 
status, lndoc and ppen, and the loan amount at origination, origamt.   
The FICO score measures the consumer’s ability to meet prior financial 
obligations, and therefore borrowers with higher credit scores are 
expected to default less often.  However, the relationship between 
credit scores and the likelihood of prepayment is unclear.  The fixed 
rate loans in our sample have a higher average FICO score (664) than 
the adjustable rate loans (603). Given all these loans are included in 
ABS securities; the market has treated them as not-prime or subprime 
loans.  It appears that the securitized FRM subprime represents the 
better or A- and Alternative-A segments of the subprime market.  In 
contrast, the FICO scores on the ARM loans are low enough that these 
loans are most likely to represent the higher cost segments such as 
the B&C segment of subprime.  The current loan-to-value ratio, cltv, is 
calculated using the reported outstanding loan balance in each month 
and the house value updated by the OFHEO metropolitan area house 
price index.x  This variable measures the equity position of the 
borrower and can be a strong predictor of both default and prepay 
probabilities.  When a loan is in low or negative equity (higher cltv), it 
is often “in the money” to default and put the mortgage back to the 
lender or investor.  On the other hand, substantial positive equity 
compensates for other risks such as weak credit history, making it 
easier to refinance the mortgage.  In our samples, the hybrid loans 
have slightly higher loan-to-value ratio than the fixed rate loans (78 
percent vs. 73 percent).            
About 19 percent of the hybrids in the sample provided limited 
or no documentation (lndoc) of income or down payment sources.  In 
contrast, the figure is twice as high for the FRMs.  Lack of 
documentation may indicate additional risks associated with future 
incomes and thus is expected to increase default probabilities.  In 
addition, in 40 percent of fixed rate loan-months there is a 
prepayment penalty in effect (ppen), compared with almost 70 percent 
for hybrid rate loans.  These penalties make it more costly to prepay a 
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mortgage, thus in their presence the prepayment probabilities should 
be lower.  Prepayment penalties have also been found to increase 
default probabilities (Quercia, Stegman and Davis (2005)), possibly 
because they increase the cost of prepaying relative to default when a 
loan becomes delinquent.  Fixed rate loans are larger (origamt) on 
average than hybrid rate loans.  During estimation the coefficient on 
loan amount will likely reflect other unobserved characteristics that 
correlate with loan amount.  These characteristics could include 
missing wealth indicators and the stability of the neighborhood.  If 
more wealth and more stable neighborhoods are positively correlated 
with loan size then loan size will likely be related to higher rate of 
prepayment and lower rates of default.        
In the fixed rate model we include refi, a variable that measures 
the extent that it is “in the money” to refinance a fixed rate mortgage.  
For each borrower j in each month t, the proxy of the call option is 
calculated as the percentage reduction in the present value of future 
payments for the refinanced mortgage (PVjr) relative to that for the 
current mortgage (PVjc)xi: 







 

jc
jrjc
jt
PV
PVPV
refi
)(
.       
 (7) 
Thus we expect prepayment probability for fixed rate loans to 
increase when the value of the prepayment option (refi) is large.   
In the adjustable rate model we follow Ambrose, LaCour-Little, 
and Huszar (2005) and define a series of variables that might influence 
the default and prepay probabilities of the 2/28 hybrid loans.  One 
factor likely to induce default or prepayment is the payment shock 
(pmtshock) faced by the borrower at each interest rate adjustment 
date.  Payment shocks can be caused by the loan having a 
teaser/discount during the fixed rate period (where initial rate is below 
the fully indexed rate) or by an increase in the value of the index (the 
6-month LIBOR) since the last adjustment.  Specifically, for each loan j 
in each adjustment period k we calculate the variable pmtshock as 
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Thus, pmtshock is the percentage increase in the monthly 
payment (PMT) relative to that in the previous adjustment period 
(negative values are set to zero).  The variable is zero for the first 24 
months since rate is fixed, and it is constant within an adjustment 
period.  The interest rate used to calculate payment in each 
adjustment period is based on the current index value, the margin, 
and any binding periodic or lifetime interest rate caps or floors on the 
mortgage.  This variable captures the impact of all of these features on 
loan performance.  We expect to see higher probabilities of 
prepayment during periods with positive and large payment shocks as 
borrowers look for alternative loans to lower or stabilize their monthly 
payments.  High payment shocks might also induce default as it is now 
more difficult for the borrower to make timely payments.   
 
We also include adjust, a dummy variable denoting the 3-month 
window surrounding the first adjustment date (months 24, 25, 26) and 
aftadj, a dummy variable indicating month 27 forwards.  It is expected 
that the probabilities of default and prepay for an ARM will shift up 
during the rate adjustment window.  In addition, to test the impact of 
payment shocks in different scenarios we define shock_adj as a 
dummy variable indicating large payment shocks (>5 percent) at the 
adjustment window, and shock_equity as a dummy variable indicating 
large payment shocks (>5 percent) coupled with low equity (cltv>90 
percent).  From the competing risks perspective  payment shocks 
associated with low or negative equity should be more strongly 
associated with defaults than shocks with large amounts of equity.  
However, lender forbearance and the use of short sales (sale price less 
than outstanding balance on loan) may temper this expected impact.  
 
Several market variables are tested in both FRM and hybrid 
models: the metropolitan area unemployment rate (unemp), and 
house price and interest rate volatility (varhpi and varint/varindex).  
Higher unemployment rates proxy for labor market conditions and the 
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chance that the borrower will be unemployed.  Therefore, we should 
expect higher probabilities of default when unemployment rates are 
high.  As indicated by option theory, the volatility proxies are included 
to measure the extent that it makes sense to delay entering default or 
prepayment even if it is in the money to do so in the current period 
(Kau and Kim (1994)).  In particular, if house prices are volatile it may 
make sense to wait to see if the value of the option increases in the 
future (larger negative equity).  The same logic applies to interest 
rates.  If interest rates are volatile it may make sense to wait for it to 
become more deeply in the money in the future to refinance.  To 
measure the volatility of interest rates the 6-month LIBOR (the index) 
is used for hybrids and 1-year Treasury yields for FRMs.  Lastly, in the 
hybrid model we include a measure of the spread between the 
prevailing 30-year fixed rate and the prevailing 1-year ARM rate 
(spread) to proxy for the benefits of shifting from an ARM to an FRM.  
Results 
The results largely meet expectations in terms of statistical 
significance and coefficient signs.  In terms of the traditional risk 
drivers (equity, interest rates, and credit scores) both hybrids and 
FRMs react in the same direction, although with different magnitudes.  
The most striking difference between hybrids and FRMs occurs during 
the first rate adjustment period when the loan converts from a fixed 
rate to an adjustable rate.   
Tables 3 through 6 report the estimated coefficients for four 
different specifications.  Specifications I and III do not allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity, while II and IV do.  Specifications I and II 
estimate a parametric (quadratic) baseline, while III and IV include a 
proportionally shifted PSA baseline. In general, coefficient estimates 
are sensitive to the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity 
parameters but are very similar in both baseline specifications.  The 
variable that measures the extent that a change in interest rates 
increases monthly payments (pmtshock) is especially sensitive to 
unobserved characteristics.  This result may be because the 
explanatory variables do not include important borrower-specific 
variables such as the amount of debt and wealth available to soften 
the impact of payment shocks. One drawback of the quadratic baseline 
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is that it relies on an increasingly small sample of defaulted loans as 
the loans get older.  This shrinking data set is not due to right 
censoring but instead due to the very low survivor rate, as previously 
shown using the Kaplan-Meier hazards, of subprime loans.  Therefore, 
we will focus on the estimates using the PSA baseline. 
The unobserved parameter estimates are all significant at the 1 
percent level or higher and show substantial unobserved heterogeneity 
in default and prepayment for both hybrid and fixed rate 
specifications.  However, the organization of the loans into low and 
high default and prepayment groups differs across the two loan types.  
For the FRMs the majority of loans are in the low default and low 
prepayment groups.  For the hybrids the majority of loans are in the 
low default and high prepayment groups.  This indicates that 
unobserved loan and borrower characteristics may be different in the 
hybrid and fixed rate environments.  In addition, note that the location 
parameter estimates ( ’s) are positive using the PSA baseline.  This 
indicates that the PSA baseline is being proportionally shifted up for all 
loan groups and reflects the high termination rates of subprime loans 
relative to the assumptions used to create the PSA baseline. 
The Baseline of Hybrid and Fixed Rate Loans 
Figures 5 and 6 provide a graphical representation of the PSA 
baselines using conditional monthly probability estimates.  Figure 5 
represents the estimated baselines for the average fixed and the 
average hybrid loan as the loan ages.  For FRMs as the loan ages the 
probability of default increases to a high of 0.43 percent and the 
probability of prepayment increases to a high of 5.04 percent.  Both of 
these are multiples of the standard PSA (0.05 percent for default and 
0.50 percent for prepayment).  In terms of default, the hybrids have a 
substantially higher probability of default regardless of the age of the 
loan.  In terms of prepayment it is not until the adjustment period that 
hybrid prepayment probabilities are substantially higher than those of 
FRMs (almost 6 percent relative to 4.5 percent).  However, after the 
adjustment period the probability of prepayment for the hybrids drops 
substantially below the FRM level.   
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Figure 6 controls for borrower and loan characteristics by using 
the characteristics of the average hybrid on the FRM coefficient 
estimates.  After this adjustment, in terms of default probabilities the 
difference between the hybrid and FRM is greatly diminished.  Hybrid 
default probabilities do increase a little faster in the first two years, but 
after the first adjustment time period the default baseline for the 
hybrid and FRM are very similar.  In terms of prepayment the hybrid 
probabilities do increase faster during the first two years and increase 
substantially during the adjustment period.  However, after the 
adjustment period the hybrids prepay at a lower rate for the rest of 
the life of the loan.   Figure 7 plots this information from a cumulative 
perspective.  The figure emphasizes that there is very little difference 
between hybrid and FRM default baselines.  In fact, at the end of five 
years almost exactly 18 percent of the loans have defaulted and 
almost 70 percent of loans have prepaid regardless of loan type.  The 
major difference is that the hybrids tend to prepay earlier (before and 
during the first rate adjustment).   
Perhaps surprisingly, estimates of baseline cumulative 
termination rates using hybrid prime loans are very similar to the 
subprime termination rates.  For example, Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and 
Huszar (2005) estimated that after 5 years just over 70 percent of the 
loans had prepaid and approximately 25 percent had defaulted. xii  
However, in contrast to our results they found that after the 
conversion (first adjustment time period) default probabilities were 
elevated and prepayments returned to their parametric baseline 
hazard.  
Figure 5 through 7 are driven by the variables adjust, which 
measures the impact of the first adjustment time period when the loan 
changes from fixed to adjustable rates, and aftadj, which controls for 
the remaining time period when the loan is an ARM.  All other 
variables were evaluated at their means.  This implies that the 
baselines shown assume that interest rates are essentially constant 
and as a result there is no payment shock when the rate adjusts.  The 
coefficient estimates and the elasticity estimates in Tables 7 and 8 
indicate that the termination of hybrid loans is also sensitive to the 
size of the payment shock.  In particular, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the payment shock is associated with a 47.3 percent 
increase in the probability of prepaying and a 23.9 percent increase in 
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the probability of default.  This is strong evidence that in rising rate 
environments even more subprime borrowers try to find an alternative 
mortgage; and, if they do not, the likelihood of default is also 
elevated.  
Figures 8 and 9 focus on the first adjustment time period and 
introduce a large payment shock (greater than 5 percent increase) 
during the adjustment period when the borrower has a good 
proportion of equity in the home (shock_adj) and when the borrower 
has little equity in the home (shock_equity).  The monthly conditional 
probabilities are normalized to 1 in month 23 and then followed until 
the 36th month of the loans life.  Figures 8 and 9 also assume that the 
second adjustment period, which starts in month 31, has no payment 
shock (interest rates are held constant from month 25 forward in 
time).  Reflecting the impact of adjust and aftadj, if there is no 
payment shock in the first adjustment period defaults are not 
materially affected, but prepayments are suppressed thereafter.  This 
reflects the realization that the transition into the adjustable rate did 
not drive up the debt service burden.   
If there is a big payment shock during the first adjustment 
period as reflected by shock_adj both defaults and prepayments are 
elevated for the next six months.  The incidence of prepayment 
doubles and the incidence of default triples. If a big payment shock 
happens to a borrower with low equity (shock_equity) in the home the 
increased rate of both types of termination are even larger.  Relative 
to month 23 the probability of default increases 6 times and the 
probability of prepayment increases 2.5 times.  Therefore, it is the 
classic combination of the borrower not having enough equity on the 
home in conjunction with a trigger event that drastically increases the 
rate of hybrid loan termination.  The only difference for the hybrid, as 
compared with the FRM, is that the trigger event is designed into the 
contract and is contingent on the path of future interest rates. 
Other Covariates – X(t) 
This section discusses the impact of the non-baseline related 
variables on the termination of hybrid and fixed rate loans.  The 
discussion focuses on Tables 7 and 8, which provide standardized 
elasticity estimates based on one-standard-deviation increases of 
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continuous variables and increases from 0 to 1 for dummy variables 
while holding all other variables at their means. 
Consistent with prior literature on mortgage performance, 
higher credit scores at origination are associated with large decreases 
in the probability of default and more modest increases in the 
probability of prepaying.  However, the magnitude of the response in 
terms of default is much smaller for the hybrid loans (-32 percent for 
hybrids versus -53 percent for FRMs).  Again, consistent with prior 
empirical literature, the amount of equity in the home strongly impacts 
both the probability of default and prepayment.  Loans with low or 
negative equity are much more likely to default and less likely to 
prepay.  However, as shown in Figure 10, hybrids are less sensitive to 
current equity in terms of defaulting and more sensitive in terms of 
prepaying.  In addition, rising interest rates are associated with lower 
probabilities of prepayment.  Also, as expected, low documentation is 
associated with higher probabilities of default and prepayment 
penalties are associated with lower probabilities of prepayment.  The 
impact of unemployment rates is fairly small or statistically 
insignificant.  Larger loans are associated with higher probabilities of 
prepayment and modest decreases in the probability of default.  
Variables measuring the impact of the volatility of interest rates 
and house prices also meet expectations and are consistent with 
options theory (volatility leads to delaying exercising an option).  For 
example, when house prices are more volatile the probability of default 
declines and when interest rates are volatile, as measured using LIBOR 
or Treasury bills, and the probability of prepaying is slightly retarded.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
The theories of mortgage selection and pricing suggests that 
high default risk borrowers who expect to move or refinance their 
mortgage will self select into using adjustable rate mortgages.  This 
paper finds strong empirical evidence supporting these theories.  First, 
adjustable rate loans are much more prevalent in the subprime 
market, where by definition borrowers are more high-risk.  In addition, 
the credit scores for hybrid loans are substantially lower than for fixed 
rate loans on average (602 versus 664), even within subprime.  Also 
consistent with self-selection, the profile of hybrid terminations 
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through default becomes much more similar to fixed rate terminations 
after controlling for credit scores, down payments, and economic 
conditions.  Second, we find strong evidence that subprime loans do 
terminate quickly.  For example, Kaplan-Meier estimates indicate that 
by two years (two and a half years) the majority of subprime hybrid 
rate loans (fixed rate loans) have terminated.  However, competing 
risk results indicate that by the end of five years in a neutral rate 
environment both fixed and the hybrid loans will be approximately 70 
percent terminated.  This result is very similar to hybrid estimates in 
the prime market.   
The most prevalent type of adjustable rate loans in subprime is 
the hybrid loan, which mixes fixed rate characteristics with adjustable 
rate characteristics.  For example, typically the rate in the first 2 years 
is fixed and the rate in the remaining 28 (2/28 hybrid) is adjustable, 
with a rate reset every six months indexed to LIBOR.  In a market 
where transaction costs are low and an environment where the best 
outcome for the borrower is to get out of the loan as fast as possible, 
the 2/28 hybrid is a natural medium or even short-term loan that 
helps to keep payments low for a few years.  After a few years the 
borrower can refinance into another loan, which could be another 
hybrid or even a prime loan.  Therefore, it should be no surprise over 
the first 2 years of the 2/28 hybrid the loans default and prepay more 
often than fixed rate loans even after controlling for key characteristics 
such as down payments and credit scores.  Moreover, if there is no 
payment shock when the loan converts from a fixed to an adjustable 
rate there is a permanent decrease in the probability of prepayment 
and an insignificant change in the probability of default.   
As Figure 11 shows interest rates do not always decline.  In 
fact, six month LIBOR has seen large swings in interest rates of over 
500 basis points over the last decade.  Therefore, it is important to 
realize that while the baselines reveal the unique termination profile of 
the hybrids, it does not include the impact of any rising interest rates.  
By design hybrids subject borrowers to payment shocks when interest 
rates rise or when an initial rate teaser is phased out.  The results of 
this paper indicate that hybrid loans are sensitive to these payment 
shocks.  The competing risks model results indicate that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the size of the payment shock is 
associated with a 200 percent increase in the probability of prepaying 
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and a 300 percent increase in the probability of defaulting.  As a 
result, in the increasing interest rate environment of 2004-2006 (see 
Figure 11) we should expect to see elevated rates of default and 
prepayment in the subprime mortgage market.  If payment shocks are 
mixed with low or no equity the impacts are even larger – 350 percent 
increase in prepayment probabilities and 600 percent increase in 
default probabilities.  
These results indicate that holding borrower and location 
characteristics constant the type of loan used can have dramatic 
impacts on the performance of mortgages.  As the hybrid loan became 
the dominate mortgage product in subprime it made the mortgage 
market much more sensitive to house prices, equity extraction, and 
interest rates.  This is because the hybrid loan was designed to be a 
short term loan that would be refunded.  In the 2001 through 2004 
time period it was possible to refund because house prices increased 
and interest rates decreased or stayed very low.  However, when 
interest rates increased over the 2005-2006 time period they spawned 
a wave of large payment shocks that initially could be refinanced 
(refunded) due to rapid house price appreciation.  Still, even with good 
equity positions the probability of default does increase substantially.  
When house prices began to moderate and decline in 2005 and 2006 
(see Figure 11) the option to refinance was no longer available due to 
low homeowner equity.  By 2007 house prices began to stabilize and 
by 2008 house pierces were declining so rapidly that only those with 
excellent credit history and large amounts of equity and wealth could 
refinance.  Given large and unaffordable payment shocks the only 
remaining option for most subprime borrowers was to default on the 
loan.  From this perspective the downfall of subprime lending and the 
hybrid loans in particular was a dramatic and costly vindication of the 
competing risks hypothesis.  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
age Age of loans from origination (in months) 
fico Fair Isaac credit score  
cltv Current loan-to-value ratio (time-varying) 
lndoc Dummy indicating borrower provides low or no documentation 
ppen Dummy indicating prepayment penalty in effect (time varying) 
refi Percentage reduction in monthly payment if refinance (refinance “in 
the money”) 
pmtshock Percentage increase in monthly payment between periodic 
adjustment periods 
adjust Dummy indicating 3-month window around ARM adjustment date 
(months 24, 25, 26) 
aftadj Dummy indicating after adjustment date (month 27 onward) 
shock_adj Dummy indicating big payment shock (>5 percent) at months 24, 
25, 26 
shock_equity Dummy indicating big payment shock (>5 percent) and low equity 
(cltv>90 percent) 
spread Percentage spread between prevailing 1-year ARM (fully-indexed) 
rate and 30-year fixed rate 
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unemp Metropolitan area unemployment rate, lagged one month 
varint Standard deviation in 1-year Treasury bill rate for previous 15 
months 
varindex Standard deviation in 6-month LIBOR rate for previous 24 months 
varhpi 
 
origamt 
Standard deviation in growth of OFHEO metropolitan area house 
price index for previous 8 quarters 
The loan amount at origination (100,000’s of dollars). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Samples 
  FRM Hybrid 2/28 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev 
age 18.8 14.6 15.0 11.6 
fico 664.2 69.6 602.6 49.7 
cltv 73.1 15.7 78.2 12.4 
lndoc 0.396 0.489 0.193 0.395 
ppen 0.406 0.491 0.692 0.462 
refi 0.048 0.064 -- -- 
pmtshock -- -- 0.005 0.044 
adjust -- -- 0.051 0.220 
aftadj -- -- 0.132 0.338 
shock_adj -- -- 0.029 0.168 
shock_equity -- -- 0.002 0.041 
spread -- -- -0.109 0.176 
unemp 5.159 1.638 5.201 1.482 
varint 0.512 0.280 -- -- 
varindex -- -- 0.763 0.465 
varhpi 0.295 0.196 0.271 0.188 
origamt 1.472 1.059 1.257 0.690 
Sample size 72,296 101,902 
Note: During the estimation, the continuous variables are normalized (mean 0, 
standard deviation 1). 
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Table 3: Results for Fixed Rate 30-Year Loans – Probability of Default 
   Polynomial baseline PSA baseline 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
  No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Parameter Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
fico -
0.74* 
0.02 -
0.84* 
0.02 -
0.75* 
0.02 -
0.76* 
0.02 
cltv 0.51* 0.02 0.54* 0.02 0.55* 0.02 0.50* 0.02 
lndoc 0.31* 0.04 0.40* 0.04 0.33* 0.04 0.32* 0.04 
ppen 0.10* 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.11* 0.03 0.04 0.03 
refi 0.11* 0.01 0.14* 0.02 0.10* 0.01 0.14* 0.01 
unemp 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
varint 0.07* 0.01 0.06* 0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.07* 0.01 
varhpi -
0.08* 
0.02 -
0.07* 
0.02 -
0.09* 
0.02 -
0.09* 
0.02 
origamt -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -
0.04* 
0.02 
1  
0.78* 0.02 1.42* 0.04 -- -- -- -- 
2  
-
0.24* 
0.01 -
0.27* 
0.01 -- -- -- -- 
1  
-
6.29* 
0.03 -
7.83* 
0.10 1.84* 0.03 1.64* 0.04 
2  
-- -- -
5.22* 
0.04 -- -- 2.80* 0.08 
q1 -- -- 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 
q2 -- -- -
0.11* 
0.03 -- -- -
1.25* 
0.06 
# loans 72,296 72,296 72,296 72,296 
Log 
Likelihood 
-200,208 -199,741 -199,256 -198,832 
Note: 1  and 2  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.  
1  and 2  are heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity 
groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose 
corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.53 (0.78) and p2=0.47 (0.22) for 
polynomial (PSA) baseline specification. * indicates coefficient is significant at the 99% 
level. 
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Table 4: Results for Fixed Rate 30-Year Loans – Probability of Prepay 
  Polynomial baseline PSA baseline 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
  
No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Parameter Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
fico 0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
cltv 
-
0.07* 0.01 
-
0.12* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
-
0.09* 0.01 
lndoc 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ppen 
-
0.33* 0.01 
-
0.50* 0.02 
-
0.34* 0.01 
-
0.45* 0.02 
refi 0.13* 0.00 0.13* 0.01 0.11* 0.00 0.14* 0.00 
unemp 0.05* 0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.06* 0.01 
varint 
-
0.02* 0.01 
-
0.04* 0.01 
-
0.04* 0.01 
-
0.03* 0.01 
varhpi 0.11* 0.01 0.11* 0.01 0.11* 0.01 0.10* 0.01 
origamt 0.19* 0.00 0.25* 0.01 0.21* 0.00 0.21* 0.01 
1  0.53* 0.01 1.10* 0.02 -- -- -- -- 
2  
-
0.12* 0.00 
-
0.18* 0.01 -- -- -- -- 
1  
-
3.76* 0.01 
-
4.90* 0.03 2.10* 0.01 1.82* 0.02 
2  -- -- 
-
2.65* 0.03 -- -- 3.37* 0.04 
q1 -- -- 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 
q2 -- -- 
-
0.11* 0.03 -- -- 
-
1.25* 0.06 
# loans 72,296 72,296 72,296 72,296 
Log 
Likelihood -200,208 -200,382 -199,256 -198,832 
Note: 1  and 2  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.  
1  and 2  are heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity 
groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose 
corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.53 (0.78) and p2=0.47 (0.22) for 
polynomial (PSA) baseline specification. * indicates coefficient is significant at the 99% 
level. 
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Table 5: Results for Hybrid 2/28 Rate Loans – Probability of Default 
  Polynomial baseline PSA baseline 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
  No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Parameter Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
fico -
0.36* 
0.01 -
0.41* 
0.02 -
0.36* 
0.01 -
0.38* 
0.01 
cltv 0.23* 0.01 0.29* 0.02 0.23* 0.01 0.26* 0.01 
lndoc 0.36* 0.03 0.42* 0.03 0.36* 0.03 0.38* 0.03 
ppen 0.06* 0.02 0.17* 0.03 0.06* 0.02 0.12* 0.03 
pmtshock 0.01* 0.00 0.20* 0.02 0.01* 0.00 0.21* 0.02 
adjust -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.13* 0.05 0.07 0.05 
aftadj -
0.36* 
0.04 -
0.62* 
0.05 -
0.11* 
0.03 -
0.35* 
0.03 
shock_adj -
0.95* 
0.08 -
1.17* 
0.08 -
0.93* 
0.08 -
1.18* 
0.08 
shock_equit
y 
0.81* 0.13 0.67* 0.13 0.79* 0.13 0.63* 0.13 
spread 0.08* 0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 
unemp -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
varindex 0.08* 0.01 0.09* 0.01 0.09* 0.01 0.09* 0.01 
varhpi -
0.12* 
0.01 -
0.12* 
0.01 -
0.12* 
0.01 -
0.12* 
0.01 
origamt -
0.07* 
0.01 -
0.08* 
0.01 -
0.07* 
0.01 -
0.07* 
0.01 
1  
1.03* 0.02 1.04* 0.02 -- -- -- -- 
2  
-
0.23* 
0.01 -
0.22* 
0.01 -- -- -- -- 
1  
-
5.21* 
0.02 -
4.53* 
0.08 3.13* 0.02 2.80* 0.09 
2  
-- -- -
5.95* 
0.11 -- -- 3.55* 0.07 
q1 -- -- 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 
q2 -- -- 0.96* 0.12 -- -- -
0.91* 
0.09 
# loans 101,902 101,902 101,902 101,902 
Log 
Likelihood 
-260,222 -258,859 -259,179 -257,440 
Note: 1  and 2  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.  
1  and 2  are heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity 
groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose 
corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.28 (0.71) and p2=0.72 (0.29) for 
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polynomial (PSA) baseline specification. * indicates coefficient is significant at the 99% 
level. 
Table 6: Results for Hybrid 2/28 Rate Loans – Probability of Prepay 
  Polynomial baseline PSA baseline 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
  No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
No unobserved 
heterogeneity 
With 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Parameter Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
fico 0.08* 0.00 0.11* 0.01 0.09* 0.00 0.10* 0.01 
cltv -
0.23* 
0.01 -
0.31* 
0.01 -
0.19* 
0.01 -
0.30* 
0.01 
lndoc -
0.12* 
0.01 -
0.14* 
0.02 -
0.11* 
0.01 -
0.12* 
0.02 
ppen -
0.66* 
0.01 -
0.72* 
0.01 -
0.65* 
0.01 -
0.73* 
0.01 
pmtshock 0.01* 0.00 0.39* 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.39* 0.01 
adjust 0.41* 0.02 0.21* 0.02 0.40* 0.02 0.30* 0.02 
aftadj -
0.19* 
0.02 -
0.66* 
0.02 -
0.34* 
0.01 -
0.45* 
0.02 
shock_adj -
0.30* 
0.03 -
0.90* 
0.03 -
0.28* 
0.03 -
0.87* 
0.03 
shock_equit
y 
0.62* 0.06 0.53* 0.07 0.61* 0.06 0.50* 0.07 
spread 0.07* 0.01 -
0.02* 
0.01 0.05* 0.01 -
0.03* 
0.01 
unemp -
0.02* 
0.00 -
0.02* 
0.01 -
0.03* 
0.00 -
0.02* 
0.01 
varindex -
0.03* 
0.01 -
0.03* 
0.01 -
0.01* 
0.01 -
0.02* 
0.01 
varhpi 0.10* 0.00 0.11* 0.01 0.11* 0.00 0.11* 0.01 
origamt 0.19* 0.00 0.23* 0.01 0.20* 0.00 0.23* 0.01 
1  
0.87* 0.01 0.95* 0.01 -- -- -- -- 
2  
-
0.26* 
0.00 -
0.22* 
0.00 -- -- -- -- 
1  
-
3.35* 
0.01 -
4.53* 
0.07 2.67* 0.01 3.07* 0.02 
2  
-- -- -
2.99* 
0.03 -- -- 1.52* 0.05 
q1 -- -- 0.00 -- -- -- 0.00 -- 
q2 -- -- 0.96* 0.12 -- -- -
0.91* 
0.09 
# loans 101,902 101,902 101,902 101,902 
Log 
Likelihood 
-260,222 -258,859 -259,179 -257,440 
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Note: 1  and 2  are baseline parameters that correspond to age and age squared.  
1  and 2  are heterogeneity parameters that correspond to the two heterogeneity 
groups.  q1 and q2 are the mass point estimates (q1 is normalized to 0), whose 
corresponding logistic transformations are p1=0.28 (0.71) and p2=0.72 (0.29) for 
polynomial (PSA) baseline specification. * indicates coefficient is significant at the 99% 
level.  
Table 7: Standardized Elasticity – Fixed Rate Mortgages 
  Polynomial Baseline PSA Baseline 
Variable Default Prepay Default Prepay 
fico -56.8% 1.5% -53.3% 2.4% 
cltv 72.0% -11.5% 65.5% -8.6% 
lndoc 49.2% 2.6% 37.9% 0.8% 
ppen -5.3% -39.1% 4.1% -36.4% 
refi 14.7% 13.5% 15.3% 15.4% 
unemp 0.6% 4.5% 1.5% 5.9% 
varint 6.4% -3.7% 7.4% -3.1% 
varhpi -7.2% 11.3% -8.3% 11.0% 
origamt -4.0% 28.1% -3.6% 23.9% 
 Note: Elasticities are calculated using Models II and IV.  Calculated as changes in 
predicted probabilities in response to a one-standard-deviation (0-to-1) change in the 
continuous (dummy) variables.  All other variables are evaluated at means. 
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Table 8: Standardized Elasticity – Hybrid 2/28 Mortgages 
  Polynomial Baseline PSA Baseline 
Variable Default Prepay Default Prepay 
fico -33.8% 11.6% -31.5% 10.3% 
cltv 34.0% -26.3% 29.2% -25.6% 
lndoc 51.5% -13.1% 46.5% -11.7% 
ppen 18.2% -51.4% 12.7% -52.0% 
pmtshock 21.7% 48.3% 23.9% 47.3% 
adjust -5.9% 22.8% 7.2% 35.0% 
aftadj -46.0% -48.4% -29.2% -36.0% 
shock_adj -69.0% -59.3% -69.2% -58.1% 
shock_equity 95.1% 70.0% 88.4% 65.0% 
spread 3.9% -1.9% 3.3% -2.8% 
unemp -2.2% -1.9% -1.9% -2.1% 
varindex 9.6% -2.9% 9.7% -2.2% 
varhpi -11.6% 11.9% -11.4% 12.1% 
origamt -7.8% 25.6% -7.1% 25.6% 
Note: Elasticities are calculated, using Models II and IV.  Calculated as changes in 
predicted probabilities in response to a one-standard-deviation (0-to-1) change in the 
continuous (dummy) variables.  All other variables are evaluated at means. 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Hazard Functions – Default 
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Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Hazard Functions – Prepay 
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Incidence 
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Survival Functions 
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Figure 5: Estimated PSA Baselines – Separate Characteristics 
 
The baseline is “simulated” using the mean characteristics of each loan type. 
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Figure 6: Estimated PSA Baselines – Hybrid Characteristics 
 
The baseline is “simulated” using the mean characteristics of the hybrid loans for both 
the fixed rate loans and the hybrid loans. 
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Figure 7: Estimated Cumulative Terminations  
 
The baseline is “simulated” using the mean characteristics of the hybrid loans for both 
the fixed rate loans and the hybrid loans. 
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Figure 8: Hybrid Default – Adjustment Date in Focus 
 
Probabilities normalized to one in the 23rd month to aid comparison during adjustment 
period. 
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Figure 9: Hybrid Prepayment – Adjustment Date in Focus 
 
 Probabilities normalized to one in the 23rd month to aid comparison during adjustment 
period. 
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Figure 10: Estimated Impacts of Equity on Default and Prepayment 
Hazards 
 
The probabilities are “simulated” holding all other variables at their means. 
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Figure 11: Interest Rates and House Prices 
 
House Price Index downloaded from www.ofheo.gov.  The 6-month LIBOR interest rate 
was the most popular index used on 2/28 hybrid loans.  Therefore, rising rates from 
2004-2006 are associated with payment shocks to hybrid loans at reset dates even 
without an initial teaser rate.  
 
 
 
i Jumbo loans are loans whose loan amount is greater than the conforming 
loan limit imposed on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The loan limit is updated 
annually by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
ii London Interbank Offered Rate (or LIBOR) is a daily reference rate based on 
the interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks 
in the London wholesale (or "interbank") money market. 
iii Both the theoretical and empirical literature on the termination of 
mortgages through prepayment and default has been well developed and we 
will not dwell on it in this paper.  
iv This benefit or cost will be realized only to the extent that the underlying 
index changes through time and the interest rate is reset. 
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v The Public Securities Association (PSA) has attempted to standardize market 
assumptions about the pattern of mortgage default and prepayments, with 
terminations assumed to occur at some chosen multiple of the standard path.  
By the standard default assumption, 100% SDA assumes a linear rise from 
0% to 0.6% for the first 30 months, constant at peak value for the next 30 
months, linear decline to 0.03% over the next 60 months, and constant at 
0.03% for remaining life.  By the standard prepayment model, 100% PSA 
assumes (1) a linear rise from 0% to 6% for the first 30 month and (2) a 
constant rate at 6% for remaining life.  These rates are annualized.  
vi The likelihood function is defined and maximized in SAS/OR 9.1 for Windows 
in Proc NLP.  While the data is proprietary, the code is available on request 
from the authors. 
vii Loans that are securitized may be different than loans that are held in 
portfolio.  Therefore, the sample in this paper may not be representative of 
the universe of subprime loans.  In addition, if securitization rates differ by 
product type then the fixed rate and hybrid rate loan samples may 
systematically differ. These selection issues will only affect the empirical 
results if the behavior of the loans is contingent on being held in portfolio 
after controlling for all observable characteristics.  In addition, the estimation 
procedure incorporates unobservable heterogeneity to help alleviate these 
concerns. 
viii Rates are fixed for the first 2 years and adjustable every 6 months and 
indexed to the 6-month LIBOR for the next 28 years.  Approximately 99% of 
the 2/28 ARMs have a rate reset frequency of 6 months and are indexed to 
the 6-month LIBOR, so we focus on this dominant type.  
ix Assuming hazards occur at discrete times, tj = t0 + j*∆ with j = 1,…,J.  
Define the number of loans “at risk” at time tj, nj, to be those that have 
reached the time point tj without being censored or terminated.  Define drj to 
be the number of terminations due to cause r at time point tj.  The Kaplan-
Meier estimate of the hazard function and the survival function are 
jn
rjd
jtr )(ˆ , 










tjt jn
jd
tKMS 1)(
ˆ . 
The cumulative incidence function for cause r is  


j
i
itKMSitrjtrI 1
).(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ   
x Other studies have created a variable representing the probability that the 
home is in negative equity.  However, the parameters necessary to calculate 
this variable are available to the public only at the state level.  We prefer to 
use the metropolitan area index to more accurately reflect local market 
conditions and include an additional volatility measure of the index itself. 
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xi The present value of future payments on a mortgage j is calculated as

 

TM
m m
jd
jP
j
PV
0 )1(
, where the discount rate dj is the 10-year T-bill and 
 
  










11
1
TM
ji
TM
ji
OjijP .  For PVjc (current mortgage), O is the original 
balance, TM is the remaining term on the mortgage, and i is the contract 
interest rate.  For PVjr (refinanced mortgage), O becomes the unpaid balance 
on the loan, TM is the remaining term, and i is the market rate as defined by 
the Freddie Mac PMMS for that month, adjusted up by the fraction that the 
borrower’s contract rate was above the prime rate at origination to reflect 
credit impairment.  
xii Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) use a completely different data 
set from a single national lender in an earlier time period. 
